Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff, which depends on the set of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero.
This paper gives a short introduction into the topic quitting games and tries to illustrate several properties with examples. First the mathematical model of a quitting game is presented. After the definition of the strategy and strategy profile the corresponding probability space and the underlying stochastic process are stated. This leads to the expected payoff and the definition of some equilibria.
For a better analysis of quitting games the so called one-step game is introduced in the second part of this paper. Important properties of strategy profiles in one-step games are posted and proved.
In the third section an important theorem from Solan and Vieille (cf. [7] ) is cited, in which the existence of approximate equilibria, under some assumptions to the payoff function, is postulated. It's proof is divided into three parts, however this paper concentrates only on the first one. In the referred literature only a few steps of the proof are denoted. It is the aim to show the proof at length under usage of the then known results.
The model
A quitting game is a sequential N -player (N ∈ N) game and played as follows. In every game turn each player has only two possible actions continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one of the N -players chooses to quit. We denote S (quitting coalition) as the subset of the players who choose to quit. If S = ∅ the players receive no payoff and the game continues to the next stage. If S = ∅ each player n ∈ {1, . . . , N } receives the payoff r n S ∈ R and the game terminates. 
where -N = {1, . . . , N } ⊂ N is a finite set of players, N ∈ N,
-S ∈ P(N ) denotes the quitting coalition and -(r S ) S∈P(N ) ∈ R N is a sequence of payoff-vectors to the players under the quitting coalition S with r ∅ = 0 (0 := (0, . . . , 0) T ∈ R N ) and r S = (r 1 S , . . . , r N S ) T .
Remark 1.2
A quitting game is a special case of a (stochastic) game, where transition probabilities are even deterministic. For comparison (cf. e.g. [4] ):
-The state space is given by Z := {S | ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N } = P(N ).
-The action space is given by A := {0, 1} N , where 0 stands for continue and 1 for quit.
We denote a S = (a 1 S , . . . , a N S ) T as element of A with a n S := 0 for n ∈ N \ S 1 for n ∈ S ∀n ∈ N , ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N .
-The transition law t : Z × A × Z → [0, 1] is given by t(z|∅, a S ) := 1 for z = S 0 otherwise t(z|S, a S ) := 1 for z =S 0 otherwise
where z, S,S ∈ Z,S = ∅ and a S ∈ A.
-The payoff function is given byr : A → R N , a S →r(a S ) := r S .
-There is no discounting in this model.
Example 1:
A typical way to describe two-or three-player quitting games is in a matrix. For example let two players be given. Player one is the so called row player and player two the column player.
Player 2 continue quit
Player 1 continue quit ( 1 , −1 )
Where means, that the players does not receive any payoff and the game continues to the next round. In this case the quitting game is given by
For further analysis the term "strategy profile" is needed.
Definition 1.3 (strategy profile, strategy) Let G = (N , (r S ) ∅⊆S⊆N ) be a given quitting game. A sequence of probability vectors π := (p i ) i∈N with
N is called strategy profile in the quitting game G for the players 1, . . . , N . p n i stands for the probability that player n will play the action quit at stage i. The sequence π n := (p n i ) i∈N is called strategy for player n, n ∈ N . Let Π be the set of all strategy profiles for the given quitting game. Definition 1.4 (subgame profile) Let G = (N , (r S ) ∅⊆S⊆N ) be a given quitting game and π = (p i ) i∈N a strategy profile in G. For each j ∈ N, π j := (p i ) j≤i∈N denotes the subgame profile induced by π in the quitting game starting at time j. Definition 1.5 (pure, cyclic, stationary) Let π = (p i ) i∈N be a strategy profile in a quitting game G. A strategy π n = (p n i ) i∈N for player n is called -pure, if p n i ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N.
-cyclic, if a k 0 ∈ N exists such that p n k = p n k+k 0 for every k ∈ N.
-stationary, if p n k = p n 1 for all k ∈ N.
A strategy profile π is called pure, if all strategies π n , n ∈ N , are pure. It is cyclic, if all strategies are cyclic, and stationary, if all strategies are stationary. Notation 1.6 Let π = (p i ) i∈N be a strategy profile andπ n = (p n i ) i∈N an alternative strategy for player n, n ∈ N . We denote by π −n the strategy profile for the players j ∈ N \ {n} and by (π −n ,π n ) an alternative strategy profile for player n in which the players j ∈ N \ {n} carry on playing π −n , that means
The underlying stochastic process
Let G = (N , (r S ) ∅⊆S⊆N ) be the given quitting game, Z = {S | ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N } the corresponding state space and A = {0, 1} N the corresponding action space (cf. remark 1.2). Set
Furthermore and without loss of generality let z = ∅ be the initial state. If a strategy profile π = (p i ) i∈N ∈ Π is given, a unique probability measure P π on (Ω, A) and a stochastic process (X k , Y k ) k∈N with values in (Z × A) exist, where
hold and P π is defined by
with z, z i ∈ Z for all i = 1 . . . , k and a, a i ∈ A for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Equivalently, P π can also be described as the unique probability measure on (Ω, A) for which -P π (X 1 = ∅) := 1 and
where z i ∈ Z for all i = 1, . . . , k and a i ∈ A for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Expected payoffs and equilibria
In this section the expected payoff for a given quitting game will be defined and additionally the terms Nash-equilibria, ε-equilibria and approximate equilibria.
In [7] the expected payoff for a quitting game G = (N , (r S ) ∅⊆S⊆N ) and the strategy profile π ∈ Π is defined with a stopping time τ : Ω → N ∪ {+∞} where
be a quitting game and π ∈ Π the chosen strategy profile. The expected payoff of the game is given by
withr from remark 1.2, γ(π) = (γ 1 (π), . . . , γ N (π)) T and E π as expected value with respect to the probability measure P π .
With use of the definition of P π andr(0) = r ∅ = 0 one obtains
and with remark 1.2 follows
Definition 1.8 (ε-equilibrium, Nash-equilibrium, approximate equilibria) Let G = (N , (r S ) ∅⊆S⊆N ) be a quitting game. A strategy profile π = (p i ) i∈N is called ε-equilibrium (ε ≥ 0) if for every player n ∈ N and every strategyπ n of player n
holds.
The strategy profile π = (p i ) i∈N is called Nash-equilibrium or (0−)equilibrium if π is an ε-equilibrium for ε = 0. A game has got approximate equilibria, if for all ε > 0 an ε-equilibrium exists.
Definition 1.9 (subgame ε-equilibrium) Let G = (N , (r S ) ∅⊆S⊆N ) be a quitting game. A strategy profile π = (p i ) i∈N is called subgame ε-equilibrium (ε ≥ 0) if for all j ∈ N the subgame profile π j is also an ε-equilibrium in G.
One-step game
The consideration of so called one-step games is an instrument for analyzing quitting games. These games are also known as one-stage games ( [5] , p. 15) or as one-shot game ( [7] , p. 269).
Definition 2.1 (One-step game) Let G = (N , (r S ) ∅⊆S⊆N ) be a given quitting game. For every v ∈ R N the tuple
denotes the one-step game corresponding to the quitting game G, where the players receive the payoff v if S = ∅ and r S otherwise (∅ = S ⊆ N ).
A one-step game has only one stage. The transition law, the state and action space are the same as the transition law, the state and action space of the quitting game (cf. remark 1.2).
For the payoff functionr v :
Definition 2.2 (Strategy profile, strategy in the one-step game)
is called strategy profile for the one-step game Γ v , where p n stands for the probability that player n will play the action quit. p n denotes the strategy for player n, n ∈ N , in the one-step game Γ v . Notation 2.3 Let p ∈ [0, 1] N be a strategy profile for a one-step game Γ v andp n a strategy for player n. Similar to notation 1.6, p −n denotes the strategy profile for the players j ∈ N \ {n} and (p −n ,p n ) an alternative strategy profile for player n in which the players j ∈ N \ {n} carry on playing p −n , that means
Without loss of generality the game starts in the state z = ∅. The corresponding probability space (Ω,Ā, P p ) and the stochastic process (X 1 ,Ȳ 1 ,X 2 ) are defined by
(1 − p m ),
The expected payoff γ v for the one-step game Γ v under the strategy profile p ∈ [0, 1] N is given by
T and E p is the expected value with respect to the probability measure P p . γ n v (p) is the expected payoff for player n (n ∈ N ) in the one-step game Γ v under the strategy profile p.
with p = (p 1 , . . . , p N ) T , denotes the probability that a quitting coalition S or -equivalent to that -an action a S ∈ A is chosen under the vector p.
With this notation for the expected payoff γ v under the strategy profile
Proposition 2.5 Let Γ v be a given one-step game and
holds for all n ∈ N , where
Proof:
follows on the one hand and on the other
In order to show that the expected payoff γ v (p) is linear in the strategy p n of player n for all n ∈ N the following proposition is needed.
with (p −i , 1) i = 1 and p n = (p −i , 1) n for all n ∈ N \ {i}, where (p −i , 1) n denotes the n-th component of the alternative strategy profile for player i,
Because of ̺ (p −i , 1), S = 0 for i ∈ N \ S and ̺ (p −i , 0), S = 0 for i ∈ S, case 1 and case 2 imply the proposition.
holds, that means the expected payoff γ v (p) is linear in the strategy p n of player n for all p ∈ [0, 1] N and all n ∈ N .
With proposition 2.6 and
That implies
Conclusion 2.8 Let p ∈ [0, 1] N be a strategy profile in the one-step game Γ v . The following equations hold:
Definition 2.9 (ε-equilibrium, Nash-equilibrium, approximate equilibria of the one-step game) Let Γ v be a one-step game corresponding to a quitting game G. The strategy
If p is an ε-equilibrium with ε = 0, p is also called (Nash-)equilibrium. A one-step game Γ v has got approximate equilibria, if for all ε > 0 an ε-equilibrium in Γ v exists.
Because of the linearity of the expected payoff γ v (p) in the strategies p n (n ∈ N ) it is sufficient to consider the expected payoff only for pure strategies in order to find out whether a given strategy profile in a one-step game is an equilibrium or not, since the extreme values of γ v (p) is for each single player attained in a border point. The following example illustrates this fact.
Example 2: Consider example 1 again. The corresponding one-step game Γ v for a vector
Player 2 continue quit Player 1 continue quit
Consider four different given v's:
The strategy profile p = 0.1 0 is a 0.1-equilibrium with the expected payoff
Because if player 1 chooses to play continue while player 2 keeps on playing continue he has got an expected payoff of γ 1
Player 2 would even change for the worse.
The strategy profile p = 1 0 is a Nash-equilibrium with the expected payoff γ v 2 (p) = 1 −1
. Because if player 1 chooses to play continue while player 2 keeps on playing continue he has got an expected payoff of γ 1 v 2 ((0, 0) T ) = 0 and if player 2 chooses to play quit while player 1 keeps on playing quit, player 2 gains a payoff of γ 2 v 2 ((1, 1) T ) = −2. Player 2 would even change for the worse, too.
Analogously to case 2, the strategy profile p = 0 1 is a Nash-equilibrium with the expected payoff γ v 3 (p) = 1 1 .
The strategy profile p 1 = 1 0 is a Nash-equilibrium with the expected payoff
. Analogously p 2 = 0 1 is also a Nash-equilibrium with the expected payoff γ v 4 (p 2 ) = 1 1 .
Obviously the choice of v is important. This leads to the question which v's are expedient referring to finding an (ε-)equilibrium in the corresponding quitting game 1 . For example: It does not make sense to choose v like in the first case, because in the corresponding quitting game the expected payoffs are limited by one for each player.
Furthermore proposition 2.7 motivates the definition of the best reply, but before stating the definition it is necessary to introduce the mapping supp. supp : [0, 1] → P({0, 1}) denotes the actions that are played with positive probability underp, that means
Definition 2.10 (best reply, perfect) Let Γ v be a given one-step game and p ∈ [0, 1] N a strategy profile in Γ v . An action b ∈ {0, 1} of player n is an ε-best reply for p −n if
, if for every player n ∈ N , every action b ∈ supp(p n ) is an ε-best reply for p −n .
Remark 2.11
Let Γ v be the given one-step game and ε ≥ 0. The second part of the definition above is equivalent to the following:
The strategy profile p for the one-step game Γ v is ε-perfect, if ∀n ∈ N :
.
Now look at Example 1 again:
Example 3: Consider the one-step game Γ v with v = 0 2 .
p is a Nash-equilibrum in Γ v , but is p also (0-)perfect?
It holds that
So with remark 2.11 p is perfect.
p is a 0.1-equilibrium, because:
If player one chooses to play continue, while player two keeps on playing p 2 , he gains a payoff of 0.1, which is less than before.
If player two chooses to play continue with certainty, while player one keeps on playing quit, he anticipates a payoff of −1, which is 0.1 more than before.
But is p also 0.1-perfect?
The answer is no, because
Which relation exists between (ε-)equilibria strategy profiles and (ε-)perfect strategy profiles (ε ≥ 0)? Theorem 2.12 Let Γ v be a given one-step game and ε ≥ 0. Then the following propositions hold: for p n ∈ {0, 1} .
Because of the linearity of γ n v (p) with respect to p n (cf. proposition 2.7) it is sufficient to show that
for all n ∈ N . Since p is ε-perfect in Γ v , the inequality (6) follows immediately for p n = 0 and p n = 1. For p n ∈ (0, 1) it holds either
Case (a): With p ε-perfect in Γ v and remark 2.11, it holds
Case (b): Analogously to case (a) with p ε-perfect in Γ v and remark 2.11
follows. So for both cases (6) holds.
2.:
Let p be an ε-equilibrium, that means for all n ∈ N and for allp ∈ [0, 1]
holds. That implies
for p n = 0 and
holds (c.f. proposition 2.7). Forp = 1, with (10)
follows and consequently
follows and therefore
where ξ n p := max
With (8), (9) and (11) ∀n ∈ N :
follows. With remark 2.11 and
Remark 2.13 With (11) even ∀n ∈ N :
Conclusion 2.14 Let Γ v be a given one-step game.
Conclusion 2.15 Let Γ v be a given one-step game.
Equilibria in Quitting Games
This section presents an imported result referring to equilibria in quitting games. It was proved by Solan and Vieille in [7] , they showed that a cyclic ε-equilibrium (ε > 0) under some assumptions on the payoff function exists.
Preview
This section studies the influence of a variation in one component of the strategy profile p ∈ [0, 1] N for a given quitting game Γ v . Therefore definep ∈ [0, 1] N as followŝ
where
That means,p m is a convex combination of p m and the pure strategy 1, which accords to the action quit. For λ = 0 one obtainsp = p and for λ = 1p = (p −m , 1).
Theorem 3.1 Let Γ v be a given one-step game, λ ∈ [0, 1], p ∈ [0, 1] N and m ∈ N an arbitrary but fixed chosen player. Then the following hold:
That means, the probability that all players play continue underp is for the λ-fold smaller of the continue-probability under p.
where r max := max{|r n S | n ∈ N , S ∈ P(S)} and δ v = max{ max 
To 2.: With proposition 2.7 and the definition ofp
To 3.: Under use of (13) one obtains 3 · denotes the maximum norm, that means y := max
Because player m plays quit with certainty in the alternative strategy profile (p −m , 1)
follows for all n ∈ N with r max = max{|r n S | n ∈ N , S ∈ P(S)}. 
holds withη = max(2λr max + (1 − λ)η, η).
Case 1: Consider player m. With p η-perfect and p m ∈ (0, 1)
follows immediately and therefore the second inequality from (14) forp m ∈ (0, 1) respectively the last inequality of (14) forp = 1.
Case 2: Consider player n ∈ N \ {m}. With the definition ofp for all i ∈ N and b ∈ [0, 1]
follows. Under use of this and equation (13) one obtains
This implies
(a) Consider player n ∈ N \ {m} with p n = 0. 
withp and r max like before.
Counter-example: Consider the following one-step game Γ v with v = 1 2 .
Player 2 continue quit
Player 1 continue quit
Obviously p = 0 0 is one (and the only) equilibrium in Γ v with the expected payoff
Let λ = 0.1 be given. It holds that ̺(p, ∅) = 1 > 1 − λ = 0.9. Furthermore letp λ,1 be defined like before, that meanŝ
From this
follows. So estimation (20) does not hold.
Furthermore the counter-example shows that the estimation in theorem 3.1 3. is even the best estimation. 
But with p η-perfect only
For the other direction holds
But the proof that ∀n ∈ N \ {m} :
will remain unaffected from this case. 
Therefore p is η-perfect in Γ v with η = 0.1. Let λ = 0.2 be given.
Forp the following hold
Sop is only 0.48-perfect in Γ v and the estimation in theorem 3.1 4. holds.
Equilibria under some assumptions on the payoff function
This section shows which importance one-step games have, referring to the detection of equilibria in quitting games. Firstly an important theorem from Solan and Vieille, stated in [7] is quoted. The proof of this theorem is divided into three parts, represented by the propositions 3.6, 3.8 and 3.9. Secondly the proposition 3.6 is proved at length by using the now known results about one-step games and their strategy profiles.
Theorem 3.5 Let be ε > 0. Every quitting game G that satisfies the following has a cyclic subgame ε-equilibrium.
1. r n {n} = 1 for every n ∈ N ; 2. r n S ≤ 1 for every n ∈ N and every S such that n ∈ S.
Before quoting the above mentioned propositions another notation is needed. LetṼ be a subset of R N and ε ∈ (0, 1) be given. ψ ε denotes a correspondence 4 fromṼ intõ V , where
Proposition 3.6 Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be given. Define
Assume that 1. r n {n} = 1 for every n ∈ N 2. for every v ∈ V an equilibrium p in Γ v exists, such that either (a) p = (0, 0, . . . , 0) T (that means all players choose continue) or Proposition 3.9 Let π = (p i ) i∈N be a strategy profile in G. Assume that the following properties hold for every i ∈ N:
1. π i = (p j ) i≤j∈N is terminating and
Then either π is a subgame ε 1 6 -equilibrium, or there is a stationary ε 1 6 -equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof: Let v ∈ V and ε ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary but fix. The aim is to construct ap So γ v (p) is not necessarily an element of ψ ε (v).
Based on the given strategy profile p, a new profilep ∈ [0, 1] N like in section 3.1 for the one-step game Γ v will be constructed such that ̺(p, ∅) ≤ 1 − ε holds. Afterwards it will be shown that this profilep satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii), stated at the beginning of this proof, as well. 6 Such a probability p ∈ [0, 1] exists, c.f. remark 3.7.
7 Let p = (0, . . . , 0) T be the given equilibrium in Γv. Since v ∈ V , a player m ∈ N with v m ≤ 1 exists. Because p is an equilibrium in Γv, v m = 1 follows. Assume that v m < 1, then player m could change for the better, if he chooses to play quit with certainty, hence r m {m} = 1 (c.f. assumption 1. of proposition 3.6). This is a contradiction to p is an equilibrium. Sop ∈ ψ ε (v) = ∅ for all v ∈ V .
